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NOTES
WRONGFUL DEATH AT GENERAL MA rrImE
LAw-THE MORAGNE DECISION
A longshoreman performing duties on board a vessel in
Florida's navigable waters was killed when a disengaged hatch
struck him. His widow brought an action in state court against
the vessel's owner under Florida's wrongful death' and survival2
statutes based upon the negligence of the shipowner and unsea-
worthiness of the vessel. Defendant removed to federal court a
and sought dismissal of that part of the complaint predicated
upon unseaworthiness, alleging that general maritime law pro-
vided no remedy for wrongful death in state waters and that
the Florida wrongful death statute did not encompass unsea-
worthiness.4 The district court granted dismissal. On appeal the
Fifth Circuit utilized a Florida procedure5 which allows the state
supreme court to deliver written opinions to federal appellate
courts concerning interpretations of state law deemed essential
to the determination of the case. After receiving the Florida
Supreme Court's determination that the state statute did not
encompass unseaworthiness,6 the Court of Appeals affirmed the
district court's order.7 The Supreme Court of the United States
granted certiorari and held that an action lies under the general
maritime law for death caused by violation of maritime duties.
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U. S. 375 (1970).
Prior to 1886, admiralty courts of the United States varied
on whether general maritime law afforded a cause of action for
wrongful death.8 In The Harrisburg,9 the United States Supreme
1. FLA. STATS. § 768.01 (1955).
2. FLA. STATS. § 45.11 (1955).
3. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441 (1948).
4. Since The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886), discussed later, general
maritime law has been held not to allow recovery for wrongful death. But,
applicable state statutes have been used to provide such a remedy. In the
interim between The Harrisburg and the case under consideration, the
courts at times have interpreted state wrongful death acts to include the
concept of unseaworthiness (see note 21 infra and accompanying text) as
a basis of liability for wrongful death, where there would otherwise be no
recovery.
5. FLA. STATS. § 25.031 (1955).
6. 211 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1968). It is interesting to note that this was the
first time a state court was consulted on whether or not its wrongful
death statute encompassed unseaworthiness.
7. 409 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1969).
8. Although all cases reviewed seemed to admit that wrongful death
actions were maintainable In an admiralty court, there was a split on the
proper origin of the action. Some cases held that wrongful death actions
were maintainable through general maritime law alone, e.g. The Manhasset,
[165)
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [VoL. 31
Court settled the question by holding that general maritime law
provided no recovery for wrongful death. However, the Harris-
burg Court would allow redress for maritime deaths by congres-
sional act or a state statute. The Court dwelled upon the analogy
furnished by Insurance Co. v. Brame,0 which had held that the
common law of the United States allowed no recovery for wrong-
ful death. The Harrisburg Court's decision was further but-
tressed by the consideration that neither English admiralty nor
common law afforded such recovery."1
As no federal legislation existed on this subject in the years
following Harrisburg, state statutes provided the sole basis for
wrongful death recovery in admiralty courts until the passage
of the Death on the High Seas12 and Jones Act' 8 in 1920. The
Death on the High Seas Act allowed recovery for the death of
anyone killed by wrongful act on the high seas; 14 the Jones Act
was limited to negligence actions by seamen 5 against their
employers for injury or death occurring in the course of their
employment.' 6 The provisions of the two acts for class and
18 F. 918 (B.D. Va. 1884); The Towanda, 24 F. Cas. 74 (No. 14,109) (C.C.
E.D. Pa. 1877); and The Sea Gull, 21 F. Cas. 909 (No. 12,578) (C.C. D.Md.
1865). Others denied the applicability of general maritime law to wrongful
death actions, but permitted such actions via state wrongful death statutes
if the deaths occurred within territorial waters, e.g., The Garland, 5 F. 924
(E.D. Mich. 1881); Holmes v. Oregon & C. Ry., 5 F. 75 (D. Ore. 1880); and
The Highland Light, 12 F. Cas. 138 (No. 6,477) (C.C. D. Md. 1867) (dictum).
9. 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
10. 95 U.S. 754 (1877).
11. The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199, 205 (1886). At English common law
the wrongful death action was precluded by the felony-merger doctrine.
Civil recovery was not allowed for an act constituting both a tort and a
felony, as the tort was less serious than the felony and was merged into the
more serious offense against the Crown. Since all of the property of the
felon was forfeited to the Crown, there remained nothing on which a civil
action could be based.
12. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768 (1920).
13. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1920).
14. As used in this paper "high seas" will denote waters outside three
geographical miles from the shores of the states, and "state territorial
waters" will describe navigable waters within the three-mile limit, excepting
Texas and Florida, whose boundaries are three marine leagues (approxi-
mately nine geographical miles) from the state boundaries as they existed at
the time of admittance and readmittance to the Union. See United States v.
Louisiana, 389 U.S. 155 (1967), rehearing denied, 389 U.S. 1059 (1967); United
States v. Florida, 363 U.S. 121 (1960); and United States v. Louisiana, 363
U.S. 1 (1960).
15. Courts have liberally construed the term "seaman" for Jones Act
purposes. It is deemed essentially a question of fact for jury determination.
Texas Co. v. Gianfala, 350 U.S. 879 (1955). For a thorough treatment of this
point, see Comment, 27 LA. L. Rev. 757 (1967).
16. "Course of employment" has been defined as engaging in any activ-
ities incidental to required duties, and, for Jones Act purposes, includes
going to and from work. For a compilation of the numerous cases treating
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order of beneficiaries were similar.17 Although the Supreme
Court held that longshoremen were entitled to protection under
the Jones Act in 1926,18 Congress removed this coverage by
passing the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act 19 in 1927. This act provides the exclusive remedy for long-
shoremen and harbor workers against their employers.,2
Shortly after the passage of the Jones and Death on the
High Seas Acts, admiralty courts applied the doctrine of unsea-
worthiness to personal injury cases for the first time.2' The duty
of seaworthiness has been defined as one to furnish a vessel and
appurtenances which are reasonably fit for their intended use.2
2
Shipowners owe this duty to seamen and those performing duties
traditionally undertaken by seamen.2 The duty has finally
evolved to be non-delegable and is couched in terms of strict
liability.24 More pertinent to the present inquiry, however, the
doctrine was gradually extended to statutory wrongful death
actions. Although not applicable to Jones Act wrongful death
claims because the act provides an exclusive negligence stan-
dard,25 the doctrine of unseaworthiness fit nicely into the lan-
guage of the Death on the High Seas Act.26 As to death actions
this issue see G. GILMORE AND C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 6-21 at
284 (1957) (hereinafter cited as GILMORE AND BLACK), and H. BAE, ADMIRALTY
LAW OF THE SUPREME COURT (1963) (hereinafter cited as BAER).
17. The Jones Act action is awarded to the surviving widow or husband
and children of the employee; the employee's parents; then the next of kin
dependent upon such employee. Each class of beneficiaries has been held to
be exclusive in descending order, so that an action may not be maintained
by beneficiaries in a class until the preceding class or classes have been
eliminated. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Wells-Dickey Trust Co., 275 U.S. 161,
163 (1927). The Death on the High Seas Act transposes the surviving child
and parent in the class of beneficiaries.
18. International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50 (1926).
19. 33 U.S.C. §3 901-905 (1927).
20. 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1927).
21. Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger, 259 U.S. 255 (1922). The Carlisle
decision was based on a statement by the Court in The Osceola, 189 U.S.
159 (1903). Note seaworthiness was considered a general maritime standard
of care and was not embodied explicitly in either of the wrongful death acts
or in state wrongful death acts. For a comprehensive discussion of this
plaintiff-oriented concept see GILMORE AND BLACK § 6-38 (1957).
22. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960).
23. Pope & Talbot v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953) (repairmen on board ship);
Sieracki v. Seas Shipping Co., 328 U.S. 85 (1946) (longshoremen on board
ship).
24. Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944). See also GILMORE
AND BLACK ,§ 6-39 at 317-320 (1957).
25. The Jones Act applies the negligence standard from the Federal
Employer's Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1939).
26. "Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act,
neglect, or default . . . " 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1920). The Supreme Court inti-
mated that the concept of unseaworthiness could be Included in this act.
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arising in territorial waters, application of unseaworthiness was
accomplished by admiralty courts' postulating that such a con-
cept was embodied in state wrongful death statutes. 7 Therefore,
even though the Jones Act was not available as a vehicle for
the application of unseaworthiness, the restrictive provisions of
the act were circumvented by seamen's representatives claiming
the doctrine's availability through either state statutes or the
Death on the High Seas Act, depending upon the location of the
death. In 1964, this tactic was limited in territorial waters by
the Supreme Court's holding in Gillespie v. United States Steel
Corp.28 that Jones Act seamen's representatives were limited to
the exclusive use of that act. Thus, at the time of Moragne,
Jones Act seamen's representatives had resort to the doctrine of
unseaworthiness only if the death occurred on high seas. How-
ever, representatives of those maritime workers who were not
considered seamen for Jones Act purposes, but who were deemed
seamen for the application of unseaworthiness, had access to
unseaworthiness regardless of the location of decedent's death.
Representatives of all other persons killed on navigable waters
had access to negligence actions 29 under the Death on the High
Seas Act and state wrongful death statutes, depending upon the
location of the death.
The use of state wrongful death statutes was obviously at
odds with the admiralty principle that general maritime law
should be uniform throughout the United States. 0 The Supreme
Court drifted even further from uniformity in The Tungus v.
Skovgaard,81 which held that when a federal court sitting in
admiralty adopted a state cause of action for wrongful death,
this action had to be applied as an integrated whole. The Tungus
dissenters maintained that state statutes were available for
merely remedial purposes and that application of that remedy to
a breach of maritime duty would not disturb the general char-
acteristics of the general maritime law. Hess v. United States 2
held that in cases requiring the use of state statutes, the conduct
Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426 (1958). The application could
only be extended to seamen or those who performed duties traditionally
undertaken by seamen.
27. The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959); Holland v. Steag, 143
F. Supp. 203 (D. Mass. 1956).
28. 379 U.S. 148 (1964).
29. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
80. The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 575 (1874).
31. 358 U.S. 588 (1959).
82. 361 U.S. 814 (1960).
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was to be measured by state rather than federal standards. As
Justice Harlan observed, this decision came dangerously close to
abrogating the constitutional principle of supremacy of federal
substantive law governing cases arising within admiralty juris-
diction and caused vagueness to appear where the framers of the
Constitution had envisioned uniformity,.8 In a related case
decided in the same term84 certain members of the Court
expressed doubts as to when state law was to be applied.85 Thus
at the time of the Moragne decision, the law governing maritime
wrongful deaths was both complex and confusing.
By overruling The Harrisburg, the Moragne Court achieved
two heretofore illusive objectives: (1) establishment of a basis
for the uniform enforcement of the law concerning maritime
wrongful deaths, and (2) elimination of the incongruous absence
of a wrongful death action in the rather liberal scheme of gen-
eral maritime law. The Court found that it was the policy of
the United States to allow recovery for wrongful death by
observing that every state had allowed such recovery by statute,
as had Congress.80 The overruling of The Harrisburg was justi-
fied by emphasizing that much of that decision was based on the
English felony-merger doctrinew which, even at the time of The
Harrisburg, had all but disappeared from the English common
law.88 To quiet any possible apprehension among shipowners,
the Court clearly stated that this ruling would not change the
substantive duties shipowners were obliged to fulfill.8 9
While today the general maritime law affords an action40 for
33. Id. at 322.
34. Goett v. Union Carbide, 361 U.S. 340 (1960).
35. "The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Douglas, and Mr.
Justice Brennan join this opinion, but solely under compulsion of the Court's
ruling in The Tungu. ... They believe that as long as the view of the
law represented by that ruling prevails in the Court, it should be applied
evenhandedly, despite the contrary view of some of those originally joining
it that the measure of recovery when it helps the defendant .... is not the
measure of recovery when it militates against the defendant .... However,
they note their continued disagreement with the ruling in The Tungus, and
reserve their position as to whether it should be overruled, particularly in
light of the controversy application of it has engendered among its original
subscribers." Id. at 344.
36. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
37. See note 11 supra. For a thorough treatment of the historic develop-
ment of felony-merger, see Malone, Ruminatione on the Role of Fault in the
History of the Common Law of Tort, 31 LA. L. REV. 1 (1970).
38. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
39. Id. at .....
40. There is some semantic inconsistency reflected in the Court's indis-
criminate inter-changing of the terms "remedy" and "right of action." It is
19701
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 31
the wrongful death of any person4' on waters subject to admir-
alty jurisdiction, the Moragne decision has left many unanswered
questions in its wake. The action was bestowed without any
designation of the class and order of beneficiaries. However, the
Court seemed to favor applying the class and order of bene-
ficiaries provided by the Death on the High Seas Act as it is
the only maritime legislation dealing exclusively with wrongful
death.42 Survival actions," long corollaries to wrongful death
statutes, were neglected entirely by the Moragne Court. But, the
emphasis placed upon uniformity in general maritime law and the
concern manifested for providing plaintiffs with a vehicle for
recovery indicate a strong possibility that survival actions will be
allowed. In question also is the prescriptive period applicable to
wrongful death actions. A resort to state statutes of limitations
would seem contrary to the Court's stated policy of returning
uniformity to admiralty law. A better solution would be the ap-
plication of the equitable doctrine of laches-a solution ap-
parently favored in Moragne."
possible that the decision was termed remedial to enable its implementation
retroactively.
41. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
42. "[The Death on the High Seas Act] is the congressional enactment
that deals specifically and exclusively with actions for wrongful death, and
that simply provides a remedy-for deaths on the high seas-for breaches
of the duties imposed by general maritime law. In contrast, the beneficiary
provisions of the Jones Act are applicable only to a specific class of actions
-claims by seamen against their employers-based on violations of the spe-
cial standard of negligence that has been imposed under the Federal
Employer's Liability Act.... Further, although the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act is applicable to longshoremen such as
petitioner's late husband, its principles of recovery are wholly foreign to
those of general maritime law .... The only one of these statutes that
applies not just to a class of workers but to any 'person,' and that bases
liability on conduct violative of general maritime law, is the Death on the
High Seas Act." Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
43. Survival actions are causes of action for injury to the person, which
are brought after the death of that person. The cause of action which sur-
vives is for the wrong to the person, and not for the wrong to the survivors.
44. "However, petitioner and the United States respond that since we
have simply removed the barrier to general maritime actions for fatal
injuries, there is no reason-in federal admiralty suits at least-that such
actions should not share the doctrine of laches immemorially attached to
admiralty claims. In applying that doctrine, the argument runs, the courts
should give consideration to the two-year statute of limitations in the Death
on the High Seas Act, just as they have always looked for analogy to appro-
priate state or foreign statutes of limitations .... We need not decide this
question now, because the present case was brought within a few months
of the accident and no question of timeliness has been raised. The argument
demonstrates, however, that the difficulties should be slight in applying
accepted maritime law to actions for wrongful death." Moragne v. States
Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
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The necessity for resorting to state wrongful death statutes
is eliminated by this decision, although plaintiffs will probably
still be allowed to take advantage of their provisions.45 More-
over, Jones Act seamen's representatives can use the doctrine of
unseaworthiness in wrongful death actions arising in territorial
waters,46 thereby increasing their chances for recovery. The
practical obsolescence of state statutes removes the dilemma
of trying to "accommodate state remedial statutes to exclusively
maritime . . . concepts," 47 and the resultant uniformity would
"give effect to the constitutionally based principle that federal
admiralty law should be 'a system of law coextensive with, and
operating uniformly in, the whole country.' ,8
The Court chose to await further litigation on the question
of damage computation. State statutes and the Death on the
High Seas Act were suggested as possible criteria for measuring
damages.49 The Death on the High Seas Act seems more ap-
propriate as it is designed exclusively for maritime wrongful
deaths. In addition, the use of this act would foster uniformity
more than the application of state statutes.
The issues settled by this case are obviously outnumbered by
the ones left unsettled. Admiralty courts are faced with the
unenviable task of fashioning a uniform body of law to govern
maritime wrongful deaths. In order to save the federal courts
the years of effort required to fully implement the Moragne
decision, it would seem that the time is ripe for Congress to
enact a comprehensive regime of law to govern that segment of
society which looks to the water as a mode of income, pleasure
and transportation.
James L. Willams, IV
REMIssION OF DEBT-DONATION NOT IN AuTHENTic FoRm
The sole heirs and legatees of the owner of a mortgage note
brought suit against the maker of the note and against the Clerk
of Court to have themselves declared owners of the note and to
45. E.g., Admiralty courts traditionally have not followed the common
law custom of jury trials. However, If plaintiffs choose to bring actions in
state courts, a jury trial would seem to be available.
46. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
47. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
48. Id. at.
49. Id. at.
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